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This is an important addition to the literature on nonhuman
animal welfare and rights with some potential implications for
environmental ethics. As the title of his book makes clear, Varner is working within the utilitarian tradition. As such, issues
relating to animal sentience, cognition and personhood will
take on special significance. He goes beyond the intuitive speculation often found in the philosophical literature and brings a
large body of recent empirical research to the table.
The personal setup for the book is of some interest. Utilitarian arguments have always been at the forefront of public
debate and policy about animal welfare. The major player in recent applied utilitarian ethics has, of course, been Peter Singer.
Singer, in turn, was a graduate student at Oxford under one of
the major utilitarian theorists of the twentieth century—R. M.
Hare. As time went on, Singer struggled with utilitarian theory
especially as it applied to issues of personhood. Meanwhile,
Hare struggled with a few issues in applied ethics including the
moral status of animals, but he never got beyond a position he
tagged as “demi-vegetarianism.” Varner seeks to weave these
two thick threads of the utilitarian cloth a little closer together.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I develops a solid
reassessment of Hare’s normative theory. Philosophers may
find the treatment of Hare’s metaethics a bit on the light side
but, for better or worse, interest in the meaning of moral terms
has flagged since Hare wrote The Language of Morals in 1952.
So, I suspect, not too many of the people who will be interested
in Varner’s book will lament this lack of metaethical weight.
There is a discussion of Hare’s basic views about the logic of
moral language but it trails pretty quickly into normative territory.
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He proceeds to a nice explanation of Hare’s displeasure with
the standard method for assessing the adequacy of normative
theories. This method was formalized, as much as it probably
can be, by Rawls in his Theory of Justice. According to Rawls,
only a process of “reflective equilibrium” can reasonably assess theories. We bring our pre-theoretical intuitions to bear for
and against various theories, like utilitarianism, and, somehow,
see which of them best fit those intuitions. The test cases get
trotted out, the counterintuitive results are duly logged in the
textbooks and, at some point, the theories under analysis, like
utilitarianism, are found too counterintuitive to warrant rational
assent. This method is on display in almost every ethics class in
almost every university. It is used all the time on ordinary moral claims that ordinary people assert all the time. Hare hated it.
Varner notes the “scathing review” Hare wrote of A Theory
of Justice in 1973. Instead of mere intuitions, Hare thought
theories ought to be checked against the very logic of moral
discourse. When this is done, Hare argued, only utilitarianism
emerges as a reasonable choice. Whatever is right about other theories like Kant’s or relativism or any rights theory will
be covered in a full analysis under utilitarianism. Moreover,
none of the test cases usually thrown in the faces of utilitarians will ultimately stand up. Many of the specific arguments
Hare produced can be used even if one is defending utilitarianism through the method of reflective equilibrium. This is good
because most utilitarians continue to rely on this method to
defend their theory. It is also good because few philosophers
will be any better convinced by Varner’s rendition of Hare’s
arguments than they ever were by Hare himself. It is also good
that not much of what follows in Varner’s book really relies on
Hare’s position that utilitarianism is the only normative view
consistent with the logic of moral discourse.
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Less revolutionary, and more generally agreeable, is Hare’s
“two-level utilitarianism.” Variants of the two-level approach
are as old as utilitarianism itself. There is a level—Hare called
it the “critical level”—at which utilitarianism requires that each
act be chosen so as to maximize utility. However, a world in
which everyone always attempted—act by act—to maximize
utility would almost certainly not result in maximal utility.
The world is not full of ideally rational and perfectly informed
moral agents. The world is full of unexpected consequences
that only a perfectly informed and rational “archangel” (to use
Hare’s term) could foresee. What makes utilitarian sense in the
real world of imperfections and surprises is the construction,
adoption and advocacy of rules, laws, habits and customs that
will, as an “intuitive-level system,” most likely maximize utility.
As Varner admits, the general maneuver at play here was
used by Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick and just about every defender
of utilitarianism since. It is the base for most of the standard
moves utilitarians make to get around the standard objections
to the theory. Suppose you could save three people with failing organs by killing an innocent person and harvesting his
organs to save the first three. Wouldn’t utilitarianism require
that? So goes the standard test case. And here goes the standard
response: Only if you are prepared to ignore all of the disutility
generated by a standardization of this practice along with the
routine training of medical professionals to think the practice
is morally required. Without the assumption of such ignorance
the practice could never be even imagined as felicitous. So it
would go with a long list of other counterexamples. Is it OK to
frame an innocent person if doing so would stop a crime wave?
Is it OK to drown your Aunt Bea in a bathtub in order to secure
her inheritance and then do good with it? Is it OK to publicly
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torture prisoners for the amusement of the sadistic masses? In
each case the utilitarian is likely to respond by pointing out that
justifying any of these things would entail setting up a world
full of motives, incentives, habits and virtues that would be—
from a utilitarian point of view—perverse.
Early on, Varner brings the two-level move to an old division
among those concerned with the treatment of animals. Since
the publication of Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights in
1983, there has existed a split between animal welfarists (typified by Singer’s position in his 1975 book Animal Liberation)
and animal rightists like Regan. At the theoretical level this
is supposed to be grounded in an irreconcilable split between
utilitarians and those, like Regan, who reject utilitarianism in
favor of a belief that there are fundamental rights that trump all
utilitarian calculations. (Regan is responsible for the Aunt Bea
example mentioned in the previous paragraph.) Indeed utilitarians have not always been sagacious in their talk about rights.
Bentham famously claimed that talk of rights was nonsense and
talk of natural rights was “nonsense on stilts.” But then, utilitarians since Mill have gotten used to apologizing for Bentham’s
occasional misfirings. And, since Mill, utilitarians have usually
thought it important to develop a theory of rights. For most,
rights are to be grounded in exactly the sorts of customs and
laws that exist in the intuitive-level system. So, a utilitarian can
say, with a reasonably straight face, that animals have certain
rights—and that Aunt Bea has a right to not be killed by her
calculating nephew.
I’m not sure any anti-utilitarian is going to be swayed by the
arguments Varner presents in Part I. He doesn’t seem to expect
any such success. But even an anti-utilitarian will recognize
that Varner has done a decent job of presenting the view and
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defending it as at least one way to approach issues related to the
treatment of nonhuman animals by humans.
In Part II, Varner takes up the matter of how morally considerable nonhumans can be sorted into three categories that
must be of interest to a utilitarian: persons, near-persons and
the merely sentient. One might wonder why a utilitarian should
be concerned about these groupings at all, let alone why any
utilitarian must be concerned about them. There is some history
here. Another of Bentham’s famous claims is this: quantity of
pleasure being equal, “pushpin is as good as poetry.” In other
words, pleasure is pleasure. It doesn’t matter that philosophers
have almost universally held that some kinds of pleasures are
higher and better than others. In the end, for a utilitarian, the
pleasure of a fool is just as good as the pleasure of a bookworm
which is, in turn, no better than the pleasure of a pig. The value
of a life is to be cashed out entirely in terms of how much pleasure it yields, not what kind of pleasure it produces.
Mill tried to answer Bentham: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” The response is troublesome. How
can Mill, or any utilitarian, hold a straightforward hedonistic
theory of value on the one hand and then deny it by saying that
some pleasures are qualitatively superior to others? Updating
the utilitarian theory of value to preference utilitarianism won’t
help. Aren’t certain higher, distinctively human, preferences
more valuable than the lower ones we share with nonhumans?
As troubling as Mill’s answer is, most utilitarians have thought
there is something very right about it. Even animal welfarists
like Singer have to admit that, almost always, it would be better
to kill a pig rather than a human. One can attempt a Benthamite’s exit by arguing that our intuition in favor of the human
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is justified on utilitarian grounds because the life of a typical
human will produce more pleasure that that of a typical pig.
But what if the human in question is, as Mill hypothesized, not
all that satisfied or satisfying, and the pig is as happy as a pig
eating shit?
Maybe there is no coherent way out of this for the utilitarian other than to bite the Benthamite bullet and hold that the
only thing that makes the typical human more valuable than
the typical farm animal is that the human’s life is likely to produce more utility. But Varner tries to do something else. What
he tries has, at least, the virtue of tying him to a lot of work
done by others working in the field (notably, Singer, Jeff McMahon, Michael Tooley, Dale Jamieson and Regan). First, he
wants to hold that there is, indeed, some real value attributable to personhood that is not easily and simply reducible to
hedonic calculation. Its value emerges only within the context
of the intuitive-level system. Second, he finds this value in the
same general vicinity it is found by those noted parenthetically
above: personhood emerges as a consequence of autonoetic (or
self-perceiving) consciousness. This gets him close to, for example, Regan’s idea that a being has inherent value if it is the
“experiencing subject of a life.” Specifically, Varner defines a
person as “an individual who deserves special treatment or respect because he, she or it has a biographical sense of self.”
He puts some flesh on this idea by drawing on Marya
Schechtman’s The Constitution of Selves. Under this view full
personhood can only emerge in individuals who can locate
themselves within a story of their lives. The special, and moral,
significance of the sort of stories persons use to locate themselves in the world of other beings and other selves explains
why there is something special about Socrates that is lacking in
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the pig. Socrates lives in a story. The pig can only have a story
if a person like Socrates tells it. Even then, the story of the pig
is not something the pig is really aware of. It cannot enrich the
existence of the pig with a complex narrative that ties together
the past, the present and the future. It cannot bring meaning to
the whole of the pig’s life and to the daily burdens of the beast.
As such, we cannot have respect for the life of the pig in the
same way we can for the person. The person’s life has a trajectory that rises from awareness of the past and projects itself as
plans for the future. Interference with these plans damages the
person and wanton disregard for these plans shows disrespect
of the person.
Varner doesn’t mention this but this autonoetic tack ties him
in not just with people currently working in the realm of animal
ethics but with the utilitarian tradition going back to Mill. Anyone who has been confused by Mill’s claim that some pleasures
are qualitatively better than others has probably been able to
guess that Mill thinks the confusion is somehow settled by an
appeal to his views about individuality. As these views emerge
in the enigmatically romantic third chapter of On Liberty Mill
stresses the importance of struggling to develop one’s own
tastes, opinions and character. It is a small step to think that he
is talking, at least in part, about the development of one’s own
story. There are other connections Varner does mention to Aristotle, Nietzsche and MacIntyre. In sum, there is nothing particularly odd about this approach to personhood. It has a pretty
rich and respectable story of its own among philosophers.
One consequence that Varner draws from the autonoetic approach is that linguistic understanding appears to be essentially
related to personhood. After all, there can be no story without the words needed to tell it. As he puts it, “competence in a

© Between the Species, 2013

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 16, Issue 1

203
Tal Scriven

natural language is a necessary (but obviously not sufficient)
condition on personhood.” A whiff of Descartes is perhaps in
the air as Varner concludes that no nonhuman can be a person
because none of them appear to be able to master in any compelling way enough of a natural language to communicate or
understand a story. But, of course, Varner is not going to argue,
as Descartes did, that nonhumans are, therefore, non-conscious
and, therefore, just machines. Also, he is not going to rest his
case on a simple assertion that no nonhumans are capable of
mastering a natural language. Varner makes this claim on the
basis of research.
This same body of research indicates that nonhumans approach personhood to varying degrees. Some are close enough
to be called near-persons. Others fall into the set of the merely
sentient. Varner does a good job of presenting the empirical
research now available to a community of thinkers (i.e., ethicists) who may know little of it. His descriptions of the relevant
studies are clear, as are his arguments about why this research
really matters for the issues at hand. Early in Part II Varner
presents some of the research that bears on the issue of mere
sentience. The results are nicely summarized in three tables and
pretty closely match the intuitions of philosophers who have
been writing in the area. Vertebrates pretty clearly seem to be
sentient under any objective and empirical standard. The only
slight surprise is that there appears to be less question about
the sentience of fish, snakes and birds than some might have
imagined. Insects and earthworms don’t do so well. Octopi and
squid occupy a grey area.
When it comes to determining near-personhood, things are
a little less intuitive. The idea that anything like autonoetic
consciousness can be empirically measured across species is
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bound to strike some philosophers as prima facie nutty. But
there is research that purports to do just that and it is at least
worth a look from anyone serious about the matter. Varner is
aware of the philosophical bog he is wading into and spends
a lot of time giving good arguments that the studies he reports
really are measuring what they say they are, viz., the likelihood
of self-consciousness. He describes three kinds of experimental examinations on the issue: tests of episodic memory, tests
of self-recognition and tests for the presence of a “theory of
mind.” The third is less spooky than it sounds. The presence of
a “theory of mind” is indicated when a scheming, planning and
manipulative individual shows awareness that other individuals seem to be scheming, planning and manipulating things as
well. In the end, the group of near-persons seems to contain
some of the usual suspects: primates, dolphins and maybe elephants. But there is also a surprise: corvids (i.e., ravens, jays
and the like) and maybe parrots.
Part III ties the first two Parts of the book together by formulating intuitive-level system rules in light of the analyses of
personhood, near-personhood and mere sentience. He begins
by arguing that there are good reasons for any society to have
an intuitive-level rule against the unnecessary killing of sentient individuals. Such a rule, of course, throws a lot of weight
on the word “necessary” and, ultimately, such a rule will not
give us much of a practical tool. It will, however, remind us that
all sentient beings ought to count from a moral point of view.
The question of whether or not we are justified in killing
animals for food brings Varner to an issue that Singer struggled
with for about twenty years and never successfully resolved.
On the face of it, utilitarianism would seem to justify the killing
of animals for food. As long as cattle, for example, are treated
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humanely, painlessly slaughtered and then replaced with more
cattle who will be treated similarly what is morally wrong with
the practice from a utilitarian point of view? Aren’t all animals
“replaceable” in this sense? In fact, aren’t all persons similarly
replaceable? Varner does a nice job of pulling apart the philosophical maneuvers Singer attempted between the writing of
Animal Liberation in 1975 and that of Practical Ethics in 1993.
In the end he argues that Singer needs to concede to the objections piled up by Parfit, Hart and Hare. A consistent utilitarian
must treat all individuals, persons or not, as ultimately replaceable. In the end, at the critical level, long-term total utility must
decide all issues. If this entails weighing the utility associated
with actual beings against that of merely potential (and thus,
currently non-existent) “beings” then so be it. Two corvids in
the bush in the future may, indeed, be better than one in the
hand at the present.
An annoying consequence of this concession arises immediately. If the interests of future beings must be weighed in
against those of current beings then do current beings have an
obligation to sacrifice their own best interests in order to bring
those future beings into existence and, thusly (we suppose),
increase the sum total of utility over the long term? Here the
Harefied Singer faces Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion.” Do we
have an obligation to drive human population up to, say, 40 billion even though the average per capita utility would be cut in
half relative to the world we live in now with its population of
around 7 billion? The obvious (and, for a lot of people, obviously wrong) answer is “yes.”
There are lots of ways to avoid the repugnant conclusion but
Varner uses this as an opportunity to display the merits of twolevel utilitarian analysis. While the 40-billion-person world
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may be required at the critical level, there are lots of good
reasons, at the intuitive level, to leave reproductive decisions
to the individuals who would have to do the reproducing and
tend (either as parents or taxpayers) to the offspring that result.
This solution is not trouble-free. Neither are the rejoinders that
might expose the trouble. Nor are the counter-rejoinders that
would follow.
Similar reasoning is on display in the concluding sections of
the book when Varner moves to the issue of sustainable agriculture. From the two-level point of view, questions about how
many people ought to be raising how many animals is a matter
of how we can best engineer our intuitive-level laws, regulations and expectations in a way so as to approach the criticallevel ideal. Dashing immediately to the conundrums presented
by the ideal is fun but not entirely useful. The real work of ethics in the real world is a matter of sweating through the details
in an orderly and, ultimately, utilitarian way.
At the beginning and at the end of the book, Varner realizes
that philosophers who hate utilitarianism are not going to be
happy with this approach or the sequel promised by Varner.
Nor are philosophers inclined to larger views like Taylor’s biocentrism or the ecocentrism of Leopold and Callicott. They are
all likely to wonder why people like Varner are so obsessed
with the details of small things like pain or personhood. Vertebrates, after all, make up only about three percent of the animals on Earth. Throw in the plants, fungi, bacteria and the rest
and the percent of living things that meet the minimal qualifications for sentience or personhood shrinks even more. Why
are a few components in the package of survival mechanisms
that are vital to so few creatures of such overwhelmingly moral
significance in the broadest scheme of life on this planet? The
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promise of a sequel centered on the blatantly anthropocentric
concept of “sustainability” is not encouraging.
That outburst out of the way, I think there is something terribly right about the Harean point of view that Varner so effectively applies in this book. I’m not sure that it is logic that
forces serious thought in a utilitarian direction but something
does. Early on (p. 86) Varner mentions the work of the psychologist Jonathan Haidt and Haidt’s argument that some deeply
embedded intuitions drive us this way. This isn’t very Harean
but it may be very right.
Whatever compels us toward utilitarianism, the theory is
extraordinarily durable. Counterexamples are easily dreamt
up but hard to sustain. Even when the theory seems to say the
wrong thing it locates a serious problem in need of further analysis. Varner does a great job of bringing this advantage to the
fore and promises more of the same regarding the mushy notion of sustainability. If the book currently under review is any
indication, maybe he can pull it off. If not he has, at least, left us
with this excellent and original contribution to the debate about
animal welfare—or, at least, vertebrate welfare.
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